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Letort Papers
In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer 
and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the 
Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was 
a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks 
lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was 
a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure 
point for further exploration. Today, as was the case 
over 2 centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home 
of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition 
and transformation. 
In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled 
the men and women who, like Letort, settled the 
American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press presents The 
Letort Papers. This series allows SSI and USAWC Press 
to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays 
of interest to the defense academic community which 
may not correspond with our mainstream policy-
oriented publications. 
If you think you may have a subject amenable to 
publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish 
to comment on a particular paper, please contact 
Dr. Steven K. Metz, Director of Research, Strategic 
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 
U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, 
PA 17013-5010. His phone number is (717) 245-3822; 
email address is steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil. We look 
forward to hearing from you.
Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press
CARTEL CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO
Robert J. Bunker
John P. Sullivan
August 2013
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter-
est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 
copyrighted.
ii
*****
 Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 
*****
 All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
 The Strategic Studies Institute and USAWC Press 
publishes a monthly email newsletter to update the national 
security community on the research of our analysts, recent and 
forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored 
by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic com-
mentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in 
receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at 
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.
ISBN 1-58487-584-4
iii
FOREWORD
Improvised explosive devices and car bombs have 
long been identified as threats to U.S. Army personnel 
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have gained 
considerable attention and notoriety, even infamy, 
among our troops, who have had to learn the ap-
propriate responses and countermeasures to contend 
with the fielding of these systems against them. Far 
less recognized is the fact that a similar threat—em-
bodied in car bombs—has emerged much closer to 
our homeland within Mexico. Since mid-2010, cartel 
car bombings have taken place in a country on our 
southern border and have been targeted against both 
the forces of opposing cartels and those belonging to 
Mexican military and law enforcement agencies. 
With the election of the new presidential Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI) administration in 
July 2012, these car bombings have ceased altogether 
after rapidly escalating in their levels of employment. 
Whether this was a response to the expected shift in 
countercartel policies from the National Action Party 
(PAN) to the PRI administration that began in Decem-
ber 2012, simply a “strategic pause” of some sort, or an 
outcome of another casual factor is unknown. What is 
important is that the use of car bombs in Mexico by 
the cartels has the potential to threaten U.S. agents, 
facilities, and interests in that nation and could also 
conceivably spread to our border cities—though this 
would appear to be a very unlikely possibility based 
on the use of car bomb trends and analysis presented 
in this Paper. 
The authors of this Letort Paper, Dr. Robert Bun-
ker and John Sullivan, draw upon their wealth of 
knowledge and expertise pertaining to the Mexican 
iv
cartels and organized crime and, interestingly, is 
derived from their long-standing counterterrorism 
backgrounds with regard to suicide bombing and ac-
tive aggressor response. Furthermore, they are able 
to look at the context in which cartel car bombings 
are taking place in Mexico from both military (coun-
terinsurgency) and policing (counter high intensity 
crime) perspectives. As a result, this Paper is useful 
and important not only for U.S. Army interests and 
concerns—including that of domestic force protec-
tion implications—but also because of its analytical 
implications concerning interpreting indications and 
warnings events that develop actionable strategic 
intelligence requirements.
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings 
and recommendations provided in this manuscript 
will be of interest to the broader U.S strategic com-
munity and the U.S. Army organizations engaged in 
providing support to the various agencies and com-
mands belonging to the federal government of the 
Mexican state.
   
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
      U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs 
began in mid-July 2010, and their use has since esca-
lated. Not only was their significance downplayed by 
the administration of former Mexican president Fe-
lipe Calderón, but they were basically ignored in the 
September 2010 State of the Nation Report (informe). 
As one co-author has noted, the July 15, 2010, Ciudad 
Juárez car bombing represents a firebreak in terms of 
“an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures (TTP)” for Mexican cartel vio-
lence. Given the escalatory nature of these bombings 
to the conflict taking place in Mexico, and indeed the 
close proximity of them to the United States—some 
literally within miles of the border—they should be of 
at least some interest to local, state, and federal U.S. 
law enforcement and, ultimately, to the U.S. Army and 
other governmental institutions, which are increas-
ingly providing support to Mexican federal agencies. 
With this in mind, this Paper first seeks to pro-
vide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car 
bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, 
insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Me-
dellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that 
plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. 
It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that 
took place in Mexico in the early 1990s—car bomb-
ings that most researchers have overlooked—before 
highlighting indications and warnings (I&W) events 
identified in the years prior to the resumption of Mex-
ican cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary 
car bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much 
of 2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. Second, 
this Paper capitalizes on the historical overview and 
xanalysis provided—from both the Mexican and earlier 
Colombian experiences—in order to generate insights 
into future cartel car bombing potentials in Mexico. 
The identification of such potentials, in one sense, of-
fers us a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent”—a pos-
sible form of actionable strategic intelligence.
An analysis of car bombing incidents in Mexico, 
with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 
years, is then provided. Both primary and second-
ary use patterns are discussed, along with future car 
bombing potentials in Mexico and the United States. 
For Mexico, steady, and both slowly increasing and 
quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may ex-
ist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deploy-
ment currently appears unlikely. On the other hand, 
car cartel bomb use, at least on U.S. soil and directed 
at U.S. governmental personnel operating in Mexico, 
is presently far from a likely potential. If cartel car 
bombs were to be eventually deployed on U.S. soil or 
against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such 
as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of 
I&W would be evident prior to such an attack or at-
tacks. In that case, I&W would be drawn from precur-
sor events such as grenade and improvised explosive 
device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our per-
sonnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb 
deployment patterns in Mexico, especially concerning 
increases in tactical lethality and a shift toward anti-
infrastructure targeting. 
The authors of this monograph conclude with ini-
tial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense com-
munity support to a) the military and the federal, state, 
and local police agencies of the Mexican state; and b) 
the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agen-
cies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. Four the-
xi
matic areas—intelligence, organization, training, and 
equipment—are highlighted, and the extent of these 
forms of support that may be provided should be situ-
ationally derived to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs 
and overall cartel threats. Additionally, a reappraisal 
of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—enacted in a far 
different domestic security environment bereft of 
armed and organized nonstate threat entities able to 
challenge states—is said to be required if we are to lift 
some legal restrictions on U.S. military support to U.S. 
law enforcement agencies.
Further, the authors see the challenges posed by 
cartel sicarios (gunman; essentially nonstate soldiers) 
to be a hemispheric security challenge. In addition 
to internal U.S. military efforts and U.S. support to 
Mexican military (both the Mexican Secretariat of Na-
tional Defense [SEDENA] and the Mexican Secretariat 
of the Navy [SEMAR]) and law enforcement (at all 
levels: federal, state, and municipal), support should 
also be extended to Central American states facing 
cartel and gang challenges. Ultimately, they contend 
that a comprehensive U.S. Northern Command (US-
NORTHCOM) strategy should be developed in coor-
dination with the Mexican government that integrates 
all elements of national power to mitigate and counter 
Mexican cartel use of car bombs and other forms of 
violence and corruption, manifesting themselves in 
Mexico and increasingly in the United States. To best 
serve U.S. national interests, however, this compre-
hensive strategy should also be integrated with the 
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to create a 
Western Hemispheric strategy to combat gang, cartel, 
and other criminal insurgent threats to the Americas.
xii
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1CARTEL CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO
In early September 2010, President Felipe Calde-
rón delivered a relatively upbeat annual State of the 
Nation Report (informe) concerning the nearly 4-year 
long war being waged across Mexico against the nar-
co gangs, cartels, and mercenaries.1 Simply put, the 
crackdown on organized crime was said to be work-
ing. Examples of success included killing and captur-
ing about two dozen drug kingpins and firing about 
3,200 Federal police officers—about 9 percent of the to-
tal force—in an effort to root out corruption and raise 
professional standards. Additionally, 34,515 people 
were arrested for suspected narcotics links, and over 
34,000 weapons and $2.5 billion (street value) in drugs 
were seized over the previous year.2 While part of 
the upbeat tone of the appraisal may represent actual 
“narco war” achievements, it must be tempered with 
the knowledge that Calderón has to maintain an op-
timistic political façade and continually sell his poli-
cies to the Mexican people. His Partido Acción Nacional 
(National Action Party [PAN]) may very likely lose 
the 2012 elections, including that for the presidency, 
to the more traditionally dominant Partido Revolucio-
nario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party 
[PRI]). Political expediency thus dictates that no com-
muniqués will be issued that do not follow the “We 
are on the path of success” PAN party line.3 
It would be expected, then, that the specter of 
the escalating Mexican cartel use of car bombs since 
mid-July 2010, for example, would be ignored in the 
informe. Within the executive summary of the report, 
specifically in the State of Law and Security section, 
this is what has happened—with no mention of the 
narco car bombs (coche-bombas) given at all.4 Such 
2bombings, the even more recent mass atrocity in-
flicted upon 72 migrants in Tamaulipas, and the mul-
tiple incidents of bodies hanging from bridges—sans 
genitals, index fingers, and heads in one instance, 
and arms in another—do not make for eloquent and 
polite Mexican political discourse.5 Still, car bomb-
ings now represent a new reality for Mexico, part of 
the widening “narco nightmare” of violence, corrup-
tion, and criminal insurgency that is threatening the 
integrity and sovereignty of expanses of that coun-
try. Such bombings have amazed many researchers, 
not because they have taken place but because they 
took so long to finally come about. Car bombings in 
Mexico cannot be wished away or ignored and may 
now only be expected to continue, albeit hopefully 
in an intermittent and discriminant manner, into the 
foreseeable future. 
As one co-author has noted, the July 15, 2010, 
Ciudad Juárez car bombing represents a firebreak in 
terms of “an apparently significant acceleration of 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)” for Mexi-
can cartel violence.6 Given the escalatory nature of 
these bombings to the conflict taking place in Mexico, 
and indeed the close proximity of them to the United 
States—some literally within miles of the border—
they should be of at least some interest to local, state, 
and federal U.S. law enforcement and, ultimately, to 
the U.S. Army and other governmental institutions, 
which are increasingly providing support to Mexican 
federal agencies. 
With this in mind, this Paper first seeks to pro-
vide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car 
bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, 
insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Me-
dellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that 
3plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. 
It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that 
took place in Mexico in the early 1990s—car bombings 
that most researchers have overlooked—before high-
lighting indications and warnings (I&W) events iden-
tified in the years prior to the resumption of Mexican 
cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary car 
bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much of 
2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. 
Second, this Paper capitalizes on the historical 
overview and analysis provided from both the Mexi-
can and earlier Colombian experiences in order to gen-
erate insights into future cartel car bombing potentials 
in Mexico. The identification of such potentials, in one 
sense, offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent”—a 
possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. The 
final section of this Paper offers conclusions stemming 
from the analysis provided and recommendations for 
the U.S. Army and other governmental institutions 
whose mission may somehow be impacted by the car-
tel car bombings now taking place in Mexico. 
CAR BOMBINGS AND LESSONS  
LEARNED IN COLOMBIA
A review of the historical literature on car bomb 
use by the Colombian cartels suggests this is an un-
derstudied area and one beset with only fragmentary 
incident information.7 Both the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) are almost useless as data-
sets concerning such car bombings.8 A GTD search for 
Colombian (country) explosives/bombs/dynamite 
(weapons) and bombing/explosion (attacks) yielded 
2,365 incidents between July 24, 1976, and December 
429, 2008, with the vast majority minor in nature and 
conducted by the various indigenous guerilla groups.9 
Further, the sheer amount of bombings conducted by 
the Medellin cartel between 1988 and 1993, most of 
which do not exist in datasets nor distinguish between 
thrown/placed bombs and car bombs, make any form 
of quantitative analysis impossible. For instance, be-
tween mid-August and mid-December 1989 alone, it 
is estimated 205 bombings, mostly small in nature, 
were carried out.10
Still, even with this fragmentary information, some 
historical observations can be made concerning Co-
lombian cartel bombing use. The first major car bomb-
ing took place outside the U.S. Embassy in Bogota in 
November 1984 and was meant as a “shot across the 
bow” to warn the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) to back off from its operations against Pablo Es-
cobar and the other Medellin cartel leaders known as 
the “Extraditables.”11 The two competing drug cartels, 
based in Medellin and Cali respectively, did not en-
gage in the sustained use of car bombs, however, until 
open war broke out between these two organizations 
in January 1988. Differing explanations are offered for 
the origins of the war. The first is based on the Cali 
cartel creating a Mexican route to the U.S. market, via 
an alliance with the Guadalajara cartel, which threat-
ened Medellin cartel dominance. Another explanation 
viewed the war as starting over a power struggle be-
tween the cartels over the New York cocaine market. 
A third reason was that the competing cartel boss-
es felt they were being disrespected by each other, nei-
ther side was willing to back down, and their honor 
had to take precedence over business.12 Whatever 
the reason for the war, a Cali cartel car bomb, which 
targeted the family of Pablo Escobar in their luxury 
eighth story apartment in Medellin and permanently 
5damaged his daughter’s hearing, signaled open hos-
tilities. The war raged between January 1988 and the 
death of Escobar in December 1993, with a lull while 
Escobar was sequestered in the palatial prison La Ca-
thedral from June 1991 through July 1992. The Colom-
bian government made a conscious decision during 
this cartel war to focus solely on the Medellin cartel, 
which was considered a far larger threat to the Colom-
bian state and, by default, sided with the Cali cartel. 
After the demise of the Medellin cartel, the Colombian 
government, directly supported by the United States, 
would subsequently turn its attention to dismantling 
the Cali cartel. As a result, the Colombian government 
faced the direct wrath of the Medellin cartel for collu-
sion with its enemies.
Table 1 provides an overview of some of the higher 
profile cartel car bombing incidents that took place 
during this war. Except for the initial car bombing 
that signaled open hostilities and may have been a cal-
culated Cali cartel ploy to enrage Escobar, car bomb 
use was typically a Medellin cartel affair. Escobar had 
little concern for collateral damage resulting from 
these bombings and generally utilized good size pay-
loads, with the December 1989 attack on the Colom-
bian Administrative Department of Security (DAS) 
utilizing a massive 1,100-pound bomb that caused 
devastating destruction:
 ‘The explosion,’ reported the New York Times, ‘was so 
powerful that it broke windows in a building across 
the street from the United States Embassy, seven miles 
away.’ The largest car bomb ever detonated outside 
the Middle East left a 20-foot-crater in the street and 
devastated 23 city blocks. DAS commander, General 
Miguel Maza Marquez managed to survive the blast—
which he described as a ‘mini-atomic bomb’—in his 
steel plated ninth-floor office, but his secretary was 
6killed, along with 58 other people. An incredible 1000 
workers, residents, and pedestrians were injured (250 
seriously), and at least 1500 homes and office build-
ings suffered significant damage. The toll might have 
been even more catastrophic had police not defused 
a second car bomb placed in front of judicial offices.13
Sources: Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords: The Rise and the Fall of the 
Cali Cartela; Mark Bowden, Killing Pablob; Global Terrorism Data-
basec (available from www.start.umd.edu/gtd/); and newspaper 
archives.d 
Table 1. Selected Medellin and Cali Cartel 
Car Bomb Use in Colombia.
Date City Perpetrator/Type Fatalities/Injured Target
January 13, 1988 Medellin Cali Cartel; Car bomb 2/1
a Pablo Escobar’s Home/Luxury 
8th Story Apartment
~ August 1988 Cali
Medellin Cartel; 
Renault with 200 
lb bomb
7/24a La Rebaja Drug Store (Cali Cartel owned)
May 25, 1989 Bogota Medellin Cartel 6/50a Miguel Maza (Head of DAS)
December 6, 
1989 Medellin 
Medellin Cartel; 
Car with 1,100 
lbs of dynamite
58/1000a,d 
 DAS Headquarters
March 1990
Cali, 
Bogota, 
Medellin
Medellin Cartel; 
Multiple car 
bombs detonated 
simultaneously
26/200a Unknown
April 11, 1990 Itagui
Medellin Cartel; 
Suspected car 
bomb
16/109c Truck Carrying Police Anti-Terrorism Unit
December 2, 
1992 Medellin
Medellin Cartel; 
Huge car bomb 10/3
b Police by Stadium
January 30, 1993 Bogota
Medellin Cartel; 
Car with 220 lbs 
of dynamite
21/70b Civilians in Bookstore
April 15, 1993 Bogota
Medellin Cartel; 
Car with +300 lbs 
of dynamite
11/200b Civilians in busy Intersection/Shopping Center
7While some of the car bombs were used in an in-
surgency role that targeted police in 1989, 1990, and 
1992, the final car bombs used in 1993 were used 
in a terrorism role against civilian targets when 
Escobar was on the run and increasingly feared 
for his life. Dynamite was the only named explo-
sive used in any of the car bombings with timer 
detonators (and in one instance a potential lighted fuse) 
mentioned in the incident accounts. 
The strife between the Medellin and Cali car-
tels extended beyond Colombia. According to 
Ron Chepesiuk:
The war spread to the United States, and, in the last 
week of August [1988], the media reported on several 
dozen bombings in New York City and in Miami.14
While professional killers were indeed being de-
ployed to these cities from Colombia—the Cali cartel 
brought in more than 1015—and the death toll for both 
Medellin and Cali cartel operatives and associates in 
these cities may have numbered well into the dozens, 
these bombing incidents cannot be substantiated. The 
Chepesiuk quote is referenced to a New York Times ar-
ticle that makes no mention of actual bombings taking 
place.16 RDWTI, GTD, and city news searches yielded 
no incidents of such bombings or incendiary attacks.17 
This is not surprising since sicarios (assassins) typically 
killed using small arms, with the Mac-10 (and lighter 
Mac-11 variant) machine pistol then highly favored. 
Still, both cartels easily had the resources to deploy 
bomb makers to the United States if desired, and, if 
nothing else, ad hoc Molotov cocktail attacks would 
have been relatively simple for the sicarios to utilize 
8against those in opposing safe houses.18 Prior to the 
1988 hostilities, Medellin cartel boss Griselda “Black 
Widow” Blanco of Miami, FL, ordered numerous kill-
ings during the 1979-84 period. Her contract killer, 
Jorge “Rivi” Ayala, stated in a prison interview for 
the documentary Cocaine Cowboys that he even dyna-
mited a house in an attempt to kill an opposing cartel 
rival.19 Still, no reference to actual car bomb use in the 
United States by either the Medellin or Cali cartel has 
been found anywhere in the scholarly literature or in 
media reports.20
The lessons learned from Colombian cartel car 
bomb use appear to be twofold. First, car bombs 
were not only used in Colombia as a warning to oth-
ers but also in an anti-personnel role to kill govern-
ment agents, rival traffickers, and civilians; and in an 
anti-infrastructure role to damage and destroy public, 
commercial, and private facilities and buildings. Cali 
cartel use of car bombs was more highly discriminate 
in its application and initially focused on targeting the 
family of Pablo Escobar, the leader of the rival Me-
dellin cartel. Later, in 1993, according to Mike Davis, 
the Cali cartel capitalized on public anger and deto-
nated two additional car bombs in front of apartment 
buildings in which Escobar’s immediate and extended 
family members were residing.21 This is in line with 
the second phase cartel attributes identified for Cali, 
based on its propensity to emphasize corruption and 
symbolic violence over indiscriminate and mass kill-
ing.22 The Medellin cartel, on the other hand, actively 
engaged in mass killing, especially later on, primar-
ily directed at vestiges of the Colombian state and its 
citizenry. Further, it also actively targeted elements of 
the Cali cartel with little concern for collateral damage 
inflicted upon others. This pattern of car bomb use is 
9in line with the designation of the Medellin cartel as 
a first phase “aggressive competitor” habituated to 
extreme violence and, ultimately, a major reason for 
its eventual downfall in late 1993.23  It should be noted 
that car bomb use by both cartels in Colombia did not 
exist in a vacuum and were interspersed with the more 
frequent use of thrown and placed bombs, kidnap-
pings, and assassinations, and street level firefights.24
Second, while the Medellin and Cali narco-war of 
1988 in Colombia spread to some of the key distribu-
tion cities in the United States, the level of violence 
remained relatively restrained and never approached 
the blatant violence witnessed during the much ear-
lier July 1979 Dadeland Mall massacre.25 In fact, while 
assassinations and intercartel killings were common 
and small scale bombings may have been relatively 
rare occurrences, no record of any cartel car bombings 
taking place in the United States have been identified. 
Some sort of psychological “firebreak” existed that 
even the more feral operatives of the Medellin cartel 
respected, thus deterring car bomb use on U.S. soil. 
Quite possibly, the specter of overwhelming U.S. law 
enforcement response locally, and the eventual blow-
back in Colombia at the highest governmental levels 
against the cartels, made such car bombings and the 
ensuing public and media spectacle that it would 
create a politically toxic option for someone even as 
violent as Pablo Escobar. 
EARLY CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO
Bombs have been utilized in Mexico for politically 
related terrorist purposes, often targeted at U.S. and 
other interests, since the early 1970s. In February 1974, 
seven such devices damaged Pepsi Cola and Union 
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Carbide plants in Guadalajara and other companies 
in Oaxaca. The perpetrators were never identified.26 A 
diverse mixture of leftist, Indian rebel, and anarchist 
bombings, with groups such as the 23rd of Septem-
ber Communist League, Zapatista Army, and Armed 
Revolutionary Front of the People (FARP) claiming 
responsibility, have persisted into the 2000s. These 
bombings have taken place both in urban locales, such 
as Acapulco and Mexico City, and in the countryside, 
for example, against pipelines in the states of Guana-
juato and Querétaro.27 
The majority of these bombings utilized small 
devices that were either placed or thrown. Three car 
bomb or vehicle borne improvised explosive device 
(VBIED) incidents, however, did take place.28 The first 
incident, which even predates the 1974 spree of bomb-
ings, took place in July 1972. According to the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents:
 
A panel truck containing plastic cans filled with gaso-
line to which were attached dynamite caps exploded 
in front of the U.S. consulate general in Monterey, de-
stroying the truck but causing no damage to the con-
sulate general.29 
The terrorist group involved with the incident was 
not discovered. The second incident, which represents 
a quasi-car bomb, took place in November 1974, and 
targeted Fernando Lopez Muino, the Cuban ambas-
sador to Mexico.30 A bomb was placed in his car by 
anti-Castro Cubans and detonated; however, the am-
bassador did not sustain any injuries. The last inci-
dent took place in 1986 in Mexico City. According to 
the RDWTI:
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A caller tipped off police about a bomb in a car parked 
in front of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. The so-
phisticated device was defused 15 minutes before it 
was set to go off. The Simon Bolivar Anti-Imperialist 
Commando claimed responsibility for the action, link-
ing it to the U.S. air strike in Libya.31 
The earliest Mexican drug cartel related car bomb-
ing took place 20 years after the first politically related 
terrorist car bomb incident. It can be traced back to a 
car bomb detonated outside of a house used by “El 
Chapo” Guzmán, a head of the Sinaloa cartel in Culi-
acán in 1992, shortly after the Arellano Felix brothers 
(Tijuana cartel) put a bounty on his head. El Chapo 
and his bodyguards were not at the residence, and no 
one was injured from the bombing.32 The next identifi-
able cartel related car bombing took place at a hotel in 
Guadalajara in June 1994. A newspaper account of the 
incident summarized it as follows:
A car packed with powerful explosives blew up out-
side a luxury hotel Saturday, killing at least five peo-
ple and wounding 15. Police sources said the bombing 
may be linked to Guadalajara’s drug gangs.
The Camino Real Hotel was evacuated after the early 
morning explosion, which occurred as 300 guests were 
winding up a debutante ball for a 15-year-old-girl. In-
vestigators at the scene, speaking on condition of ano-
nymity, said the girl’s family is known to have ties to 
drug traffickers. 
The Mexico City newspaper Universal reported that 
police said members of the family of Rafael Caro 
Quintero, allegedly one of Mexico’s most power-
ful drug traffickers, were attending the party inside  
the hotel.
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. . . Police and state officials said the automobile was 
packed with 10-22 pounds of plastic explosives and 
may have been detonated by remote control. Enrique 
Hoyos Medina, an expert at the state attorney gener-
al’s office, said the explosives were a commercial type 
sold mainly to mining companies.33
The only other reference to cartel related car bomb-
ings during the 1990s is one mentioned by Barnard 
Thompson, a long-time private security specialist in 
Mexico and Latin America and editor of MexiData.
info, who states:
With respect to the car bombing count, the fact is since 
1992 there have been at least five ‘vehicle borne impro-
vised explosive devices’ that exploded, three of which 
appeared to be part of cartel infighting that unsuc-
cessfully targeted Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada García, 
drug kingpin of the Sinaloa Cartel. The others, one in 
Chiapas and another in Acapulco, Guerrero, against 
nearby quasi-government and military installations, 
were thought to be by small guerilla groups for sup-
posed social causes.34
These car bombings against El Chapo Guzmán, the 
family of “El Numero Uno” Caro (the cartel leader had 
been incarcerated in April 1985), and El Mayo Zam-
bada resulted from the dissolution of the Guadalajara 
cartel and the early wars between the Sinaloa and 
Tijuana factions. Given the excessive and indiscrimi-
nate violence utilized by the Arellano Felix brothers, 
including the use of San Diego based Logan Heights 
gang assassins who mistakenly killed Cardinal Posa-
das Ocampo at Guadalajara International Airport in 
May 1993,35 it is highly likely that this early phase of 
cartel car bombings was carried out solely by the Ti-
juana cartel. If this is the case, it would be testament 
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to the Sinaloa cartel’s better strategic appreciation of 
the consequences of its actions and unwillingness to 
blindly engage in tit-for-tat retaliatory violence with 
its cartel competitors. 
RECENT INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS  
FOR RESUMED CAR BOMB USE IN MEXICO
With a deescalation of cartel violence between the 
Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels in the early 1990s, the use 
of car bombs ceased for over 15 years. Some sort of 
crude or mock car bomb—based on a container of 
gasoline, a false antenna, and cell phone (with either 
an inert or no detonator)—was then reported in Au-
gust 2005. It had been placed in a stolen vehicle that 
was parked at a Guadalajara shopping center for 3 
days and discovered by a security guard.36 Whether 
this device was tied to Mexican cartel violence is un-
known. Following the December 2006 Calderón of-
fensive against the cartels and narco gangs in Mexico, 
violence levels once again increased. Along with this 
increase in violence, attempted and actual bombings 
using grenades and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs), already beginning to take place, increased in 
frequency. Suspected grenade attacks in April and Au-
gust 2006 were targeted against a “. . . busy restaurant 
in the Pacific coast town of Petatlán, Mexico . . .” and 
against “. . . the offices of two newspapers, Por Esto 
and Quequi Quintana Roo, in Cancun, Mexico. . .”37 
 In June 2007: 
. . . police deactivated two bombs in two south Mex-
ico City subway stations after being tipped off. Both 
bombs were accompanied by packages related to drug 
traffickers.38 
14
More bombings then took place, including the 
pre-denotation of a bomb two blocks from Mexico 
City’s police headquarters in February 2008—the 
dead bomber belonging to the Tepito drug gang had 
suspected links to the Sinaloa cartel and an operative 
known as “El Patron.”39 Also, the infamous Los Zetas 
linked fragmentation grenades attack, killing eight 
and injuring 101, on a crowd of people celebrating 
Mexican Independence Day in Morelia, Michoacán, 
was carried out in September 2008.40 During this same 
period in July 2008, an I&W event took place related to 
the start of a new cycle of car bomb use:
Mexican drug traffickers have built make shift car 
bombs to attack police, troops and rival smugglers 
as the country’s drug war turns increasingly violent,  
police said.
Soldiers found two car bombs in a safe house in the 
city of Culiacan in western Mexico on Monday. One 
car was packed with cans of gasoline and another 
stuffed with canisters of gas, police said.
Both devices were wired to be detonated by cell 
phones, said a police official in Culiacan, capital of 
Sinaloa state, which is home to one of Mexico’s biggest 
trafficking cartels.41
Speculation exists that the car bombs may have 
belonged to a Sinaloa faction controlled by Joaquin 
“Shorty” Guzmán, who broke off from other local 
drug lords and is no longer allied to them.42 Regard-
less of the origins of these devices, their existence, the 
increasing patterns of violence in the Mexican drug 
wars, and the proliferation of small IED and grenade 
incidents (72 grenade attacks estimated in 2009 alone)43 
suggest car bomb use would once again resume in 
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Mexico. This time around, however, their use may not 
be confined to only one cartel and could conceivably 
follow the more brutal and less discriminate patterns 
of car bombings that were conducted in Colombia by 
the Medellin cartel beginning in the mid-1980s.
CONTEMPORARY CAR BOMBINGS IN MEXICO
Recognition that Mexican cartel violence had em-
braced the car bomb followed the July 15, 2010, attack 
on Federal police in embattled Ciudad Juárez. In that 
incident, a primitive IED—not the fully integrated 
VBIED variant found in Iraq and the AfPak (Afghan-
istan-Pakistan) theaters—was secreted inside a car. 
The ambush attack directly targeted the police and 
can be considered a classic TTP of insurgents. The at-
tack was widely heralded as the drug war’s first car 
bombing, which historically we know is not the case, 
and spurred a semantic debate over the difference be-
tween “car bombs” and “bombs in cars.”
Four persons were killed in this well-planned, 
“bait and wait” trap near a Federal police facility. The 
attack was the first documented use of a car bomb by 
drug traffickers or their affiliated gangs since the start 
of Mexico’s countercartel offensive by Calderón in 
2006. Clearly, the use of bombs (ranging from simple 
IEDs to the more complex large vehicle bomb [LVB], 
erstwhile known as a VBIED) portends to dramati-
cally alter the nature of Mexico’s drug wars. 
Until this assault, cartels and their paramilitary 
gangsters largely relied on small arms, limited use of 
grenades, and symbolic beheadings to neutralize com-
peting cartel and government security forces. While 
police in Sinaloa found improvised gas canister car 
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bombs cached for potential use in July 2008, partici-
pants in the drug war relied upon barbaric beheadings, 
bold small arms attacks (active shootings), and the 
occasional grenade or combined small arms-grenade 
attack to wage their battles. While all these means are 
a challenge to police, the potential specter of urban 
car bombings—with their attendant casualty generat-
ing capacity—poses a threat potential similar to the 
“conventional” insurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
After the July 15 car bombing, which is believed to 
have been conducted by La Línea, a narcomensaje or 
message left at the scene claimed the Juárez cartel was 
responsible for the car bombing and threatened fur-
ther attacks. “We still have car bombs,” claimed the 
alleged warning.44
According to Associated Press reports: 
 . . . the La Linea drug gang—the same group blamed 
for the killing of a U.S. consulate employee and her 
husband in March 2010—lured federal officers and 
paramedics to the site of a car bomb by dressing a 
bound, wounded man in a police uniform and call-
ing in a false report of an officer shot. . . . The gang 
then exploded a car holding as much as 22 pounds (10 
kilograms) of explosives, killing the decoy, a rescue 
worker, and a federal officer.45
While the Juárez platform was a simple car bomb, 
not a fully evolved VBIED, the debate over terminol-
ogy rages. VBIED is a jargon-laden term preferred by 
military and security analysts familiar with U.S. coun-
terinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some 
observers, notably STRATFOR, make it a point to dis-
tinguish between the fully evolved variant and their 
simple cousins.46 The sophistication or operational 
effectiveness of the device is only one element of the 
attack and should not be overconflated with the TTP 
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or delivery platform. Remember, “Buda’s Wagon” 
(the first modern “car” bomb) detonated in Septem-
ber 1920 by the corner of Wall and Broad Streets in 
New York City was not sophisticated in terms of the 
devices encountered in Colombia, Iraq, or the AfPak 
theaters either, but it was still a car bomb.47 
The Ciudad Juárez device was likely a transitional 
weapon. It is plausible that cartel bomb makers were 
experimenting and importing TTP from other conflicts 
to exploit on their own battleground. Indeed, after 
the Juárez attack, at least 18 car bomb incidents have 
been recorded in Mexico. Table 2 documents these at-
tacks, as well as the initial Juárez incident and a pre-
cursor incident in Culiacán 2 years prior.48 As Table 2 
demonstrates, the recent use of car bombs as a tactic 
of confrontation is now more prevalent than widely 
recognized. Use of the tactic starts with one precur-
sor interdiction in 2008, followed by no use in 2009. In 
2010, the year of the July 15 sentinel attack in Ciudad 
Juárez, five incidents were recorded. In 2011, a total of 
eight incidents were documented. One incident each 
occurred in Sinaloa and Hidalgo, two incidents in Ciu-
dad Juárez, three incidents in Nuevo León, and four in 
Ciudad Victoria (Tamaulipas). While the offending ac-
tors are not definitively known, both Tamaulipas and 
Nuevo León are areas contested by the Zetas and Gulf 
cartels. A brief overview of these incidents follows. 
The first incident recorded after the July 15 attack tar-
geted the headquarters of the Tamaulipas State Pub-
lic Safety agency. A car bomb rocked the complex in 
Ciudad Victoria on August 5, 2010. No one was hurt, 
but two police cars were damaged.49 On August 27, 
a car bomb exploded outside the offices of Televisa in 
Ciudad Victoria, causing damage and interrupting the 
station’s broadcast, however, no one was injured.50
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Date City Perpetrator/Type Fatalities/Injuries Target
July 14, 2008 Culiacán, Sinaloa
Unknown, possibly 
Sinaloa cartel; 2 
car bombs with gas 
canisters captured
0/0 Likely intended to target police
July 15, 2010 Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua
La Línea; 
car bomb 4/0
Police on foot 
responding to call; 
ambush
August 5, 2010 Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
Unknown; 
car bomb 0/0
Headquarters building; 
state police
August 27, 2010 Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
Unknown;
car bomb 0/0 Televisa building
September 10, 2010 Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua
Unknown;
car bomb Interdicted
Police on foot 
responding to call; 
ambush attempt
September 2010 Guadalajara,Jalisco
Unknown;
car bomb Interdicted Unknown
January 18, 2011 Linares, Nuevo León Unknown;2 car bombs 0/3 Police
January 22, 2011 Tula-Tepeji, Hidalgo Zetas;car bomb
1/3 Police
March 15, 2011 Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
Unknown;
car bomb 0/5
Police station 
(proximate to day care 
center)
September 12, 2011 Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua
Unknown;
car bomb 0/0
Day care center; police 
(ambush attempt)
September 16, 2011 Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
Unknown;
car bomb 0/0
Unknown, possibly 
police
October 10, 2011 Monterrey, Nuevo León Zetas assumed;car bomb 0/0
Military patrol 
(Vehicular)
December 18, 2011 Zuazua, Nuevo León
Unknown;
car bomb 0/3 Police station
January 10, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,Tamaulipas
Unknown;
car bomb Interdicted Police station
March 19, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,Tamaulipas
Unknown; 
car bomb 0/0
Expreso newspaper 
building
April 24, 2012 Nuevo Laredo,Tamaulipas
Sinaloa assumed;
car bomb 0/0
Headquarters building; 
police
May 24, 2012 Nuevo Laredo,Tamaulipas
Zetas assumed; 
car bomb 0/10 Barracks at hotel; police
June 6, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,Tamaulipas
Unknown; 
2 car bombs (arson) 0/0 Car dealership
Table 2. Contemporary Car Bomb (coche-bomba)
Incidents in Mexico.
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Sources: English and Spanish language media reports, Borderland 
Beat, available from www.borderlandbeat.com, Blog Del Naco, avail-
able from www.blogdelnarco.com, and GroupIntel Network, available 
from www.groupintel.com.
Table 2. Contemporary Car Bomb (coche-bomba)
Incidents in Mexico. (cont.)
Then, in September 2010, two incidents took place. 
One, on September 10, took place in Ciudad Juárez 
and involved another ambush in which an explosive 
device was placed in a car next to a car containing a 
dead body, which had been reported to the local po-
lice. The device, which contained 16 kilograms of the 
explosive Tovex, apparently failed to detonate and 
was rendered safe by a Mexican military ordnance 
team. The other incident took place in Guadalajara 
sometime in September and was composed of a liquor 
bottle filled with explosives placed inside a car. The 
device was recovered prior to its detonation and was 
unique because of the Futaba radio-contoller that was 
wired to it. Such controllers, used for model aircraft, 
can be traced back to Medellin cartel VBIEDs deployed 
in Colombia 2 decades ago.51
In 2011, we start to see the acceleration of the car 
bomb TTP. In January, two car bombs were deployed 
in Linares, Nuevo León. No one was injured in the 
first attack, but three people were wounded in the 
second. Both incidents targeted police. On January 22, 
Hidalgo was brought into the equation, with the Ze-
June 29,  2012 Nuevo Laredo,Tamaulipas
Unkown; 
car bomb 0/7
City Hall; Municipal 
Government
July 3, 2012 Ciudad Victoria,Tamaulipas
Unknown; 
car bomb  2/7
Private Residence; Chief 
Security Officer
July 31, 2012 Culiacán,Sinaloa
Unknown;
car bomb 0/0 Gas Station
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tas attacking the police in a bombing that killed one 
police officer and injured three. On March 15, five per-
sons were wounded when a parked car bomb deto-
nated outside a police station in Ciudad Victoria. The 
police station was situated next to a child-care center. 
On September 12, police disarmed a car bomb in the 
parking lot of a day care center. It is suspected that 
the device was meant to detonate when police arrived, 
but it was rendered safe. Later that month, on Septem-
ber 16 in Ciudad Victoria, a car bomb was detonated 
in the Colonia 7 de Noviembre in Ciudad Victoria, but 
no casualties were reported. In October, a Mexican 
army patrol was targeted in a car bomb ambush, but 
no injuries resulted. Finally, on December 18, 2011, a 
car bomb exploded outside a police station in Zuazua, 
Nuevo León, injuring three.52
The growing sophistication of Mexican cartel car 
bombs can be better understood by looking at an ini-
tial tactical analysis of the early morning October 20, 
2011, car bomb ambush directed against a Mexican 
military patrol on Avenida Revolucion in Monterrey:
. . . A cell phone detonated improvised explosive de-
vice (IED) placed inside the trunk of a small sedan is 
the most plausible—making it a VBIED (vehicle borne 
IED)—method of attack. The explosive type utilized is 
unknown but C-4 is quite probable; these assumptions 
have not been confirmed forensically and therefore are only 
speculative. A cartel vehicle was used as bait to bring a 
mounted Mexican Army patrol into the prepared kill 
zone. The VBIED was detonated prematurely with no 
soldiers or civilians injured in the ambush. Scenario 
1: The VBIED was meant to be utilized in an efficient 
anti-vehicular/anti-personnel role to produce maxi-
mum Mexican military causalities. The ambush was 
unsuccessful due to the premature VBIED detonation 
and/or the explosive yield/dynamics utilized (small 
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yield/non-directional). Scenario 2: The VBIED was 
utilized symbolically (as a warning) to the Mexican 
military to cease/limit their operations in Monterrey...
No matter the accuracy of either scenario, this incident 
represents the first recorded use of a VBIED against 
a mounted Mexican Army patrol and a further esca-
lation of VBIED tactical evolution taking place in the 
criminal insurgencies in Mexico. . . .53
Additional attacks were threatened in December, 
with car bombings resuming 1 month later in January 
2012, with eight total incidents taking place through 
July. In Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, the state police 
station was targeted with a car containing explosives 
in the trunk parked next to it. The car had been left 
next to the police station on the night of January 9, had 
luckily failed to detonate, and was disarmed by Mexi-
can Federal police bomb disposal experts early the 
next morning.54 Then, on March 19, a car bomb was 
used to target the Expreso newspaper in Ciudad Vic-
toria, Tamaulipas. The device exploded at 8:15 p.m. 
on Monday on Avenida Los Almendros next to the 
newspaper building. No casualties resulted from the 
blast, but a couple of nearby vehicles and the building 
did suffer some property damage, and the newspaper 
website was down the next morning.55 
On April 24, a car bomb was detonated in front of 
the building housing the attorney general of Tamau-
lipas and various state and municipal police agencies 
in Nuevo Laredo. The low yield device, suspected of 
belonging to the Sinaloa cartel, was set off at 8:00 a.m. 
on Tuesday morning. Pictures of the incident show 
minor fragmentation damage to a guard post, limit-
ing perimeter access, and to a section of the building. 
Minor window breakage, the partial destruction of 
the actual pickup truck that contained the device, and 
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a nearby patrol car, are also evident. No casualties 
resulted from the detonation, however, an ensuing 
firefight between Mexican soldiers and armed cartel 
gunmen was reported to have taken place right after 
the bombing.56
The next bombing also took place in Nuevo Lar-
edo, Tamaulipas—this time on May 24, 2012. The at-
tack came at 5:30 a.m. on Thursday morning and was 
initiated by the Zetas against state police, who were 
barracked at the Hotel Santa Cecilia. Eight law en-
forcement officers and two civilians were wounded 
in what turned out to be a combined arms attack that 
began with gunfire directed against the hotel, fol-
lowed by the detontation of a car bomb. Damage to 
the façade of an “L” shaped corner of a small motel 
with parking next to the rooms was evident in photos 
of the incident. Three of the officers sustained third-
degree burns, which suggests that the initial gunfire 
drew them into the killing zone right outside of their 
rooms with the bomb placed in a pickup truck parked 
next to them. A police car and a privately owned car 
were also damaged from the detonation.57
A minor car bombing incident then took place in 
Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, on Wednesday, June 
6, 2012, at a Renualt and Volkswagen car dealership. 
Two vehicles were engulfed in flames by means of 
grenades or some other explosive device, which set 
their gas tanks on fire. Rather than a targeted attack 
against law enforcement or military personnel, this 
incident appears to simply represent arson for extor-
tion purposes being directed at the car dealership by 
either the Zetas or the Gulf/Sinaloa cartels.58 The city 
hall in Nuevo Laredo was then targeted by a bomb 
placed in a Ford Ranger pickup on Friday, June 29, 
2012. The detonation of the device took place at 11:00 
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a.m. in the morning, injured seven people, and caused 
damage to 11 nearby vehicles, the side of the city hall, 
and local businesses. The blast was large enough for 
a plume of smoke to be seen from the U.S. side of the 
border. Of note is that the pickup was parked next to 
the mayor’s parking spot, and the incident took place 
48 hours prior to the national presidential elections 
in Mexico.59
On Tuesday, July 3, 2012, a car bomb was detonat-
ed in Ciudad Victoria in front of the private residence 
of the top security official in the state of Tamaulipas a 
few days after the national elections. The blast killed 
two police officers and wounded seven police officers 
and civilians. Damage to nearby vehicles was evident 
in an incident photo. The car bomb was said to be cell 
phone activated and was parked near the security bar-
rier on the street just outside the official’s residence.60 
Finally, on Tuesday, July 31, 2012, a bomb in a sto-
len car was detonated at a gas station in Culiacán, 
Sinaloa. No one was injured in the incident, and sev-
eral homemade bombs were recovered from the car 
wreckage. No other information was provided in the 
news report.61 
ANALYSIS AND FUTURE CAR BOMBING 
POTENTIALS IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED 
STATES
The present round of cartel car bomb deployment 
since July 2008 has been gradually increasing albeit in 
a sporadic and haphazard manner, with about 20 inci-
dents now identified. It has been primarily directed at 
Mexican law enforcement and military personnel and 
officials. Secondary deployment against media and 
business interests has also been identified—although 
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it is unclear if the nonmedia business establishments 
were always the intended targets, and whether incen-
diary attacks via hand grenade detonation of car fuel 
tanks, rather than actual explosives, were TTP uti-
lized.62 Still, these recent cartel deployment patterns 
in Mexico suggest the following reasons for car bomb 
use have taken place. It is expected that these patterns 
will continue into the near future: 
 1. Primary Use Reasons 
 • Threats and Warnings 
 • Psychological Warfare/Terrorism 
 2. Secondary Use Reasons
 • Diversion Creation
 • Anti-personnel Targeting
 • Anti-vehicular/Anti-materiel Targeting
To date, no direct evidence exists to suggest that 
car bombs have been used in intercartel engagements. 
Instead, the cartels have relied upon direct ambushes 
and armed assaults to combat each other, but this 
could change if a specific cartel faces an existential 
threat from another cartel (or the state). Precedent for 
a reversion to intercartel car bomb deployment can be 
drawn to the Arellano Felix and Sinaloa conflict in the 
early 1990s. Further, at varying points in the narco-
conflict, it is likely that cartels will have different use 
trajectories ranging from nondeployment to some of 
the deployment patterns described previously. Car-
tels either confirmed or alleged to have attempted or 
conducted car bombings are the Tijuana cartel (1990s 
only), the Juárez cartel, the Gulf cartel, Los Zetas, 
and even the Sinaloa cartel—which is not normally 
thought to use such weapons:
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The use of car bombs is a strategy used primarily 
by the Sinaloa cartel, which has allied with the Gulf 
Cartel to fight the Zetas, said a Mexican federal law 
enforcement official who asked not to be named for 
security reasons.
‘The Zetas typically use grenades, but the Sinaloans 
are a little more sophisticated when it comes to that 
and used explosives,’ the official said in Spanish. 
‘Car bombs have been employed in Nuevo Laredo, 
Monterrey, Victoria and the Tamaulipas coast city of 
Tampico, which are contested cities,’ the official said. 
‘Depending on where those groups are fighting, that’s 
where you could see’ the bombs.63 
Still, even with the statement provided by the Mex-
ican official, intercartel engagements using car bombs 
cannot be substantiated—at best, they may be target-
ing each other’s co-opted law enforcement proxies.
Of further note is a lack of car bomb deployment al-
legations directed against La Familia Michoacana and 
Los Caballeros Templarios (The Knights Templar). 
While these groups—both the initial and the succes-
sor organization—have utilized IEDs, fragmentation 
grenades, and even heavier infantry weapons such 
as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), no attempted 
use of car bombs have been identified to date. This is 
significant because the spirituality of Los Caballeros 
Templarios appears increasingly conducive to martyr-
dom potentials—derived from retro-Christian “blood 
of the lamb” symbolism—which, if combined with 
the VBIED TTP, results in Mexican cartel suicide car 
bomber potentials.
Also, no evidence of present Mexican cartel car 
bomb deployment for anti-infrastructure purposes ex-
ists such as that undertaken in Colombia by the Medel-
lin and Cali cartels. Fred Burton, Chief Security Officer 
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of STRATFOR, provided a well-articulated analysis 
in a video report on this subject. His analysis suggests 
that while the “capability” to deploy large scale car 
bombs against public buildings presently exists, the 
“intent” to undertake such attacks by the Mexican 
cartels does not.64 One example of the capability pos-
sessed by the cartels is illustrated by the February 2009 
raid upon an explosives magazine operated by a com-
pany from Texas doing business in Durango, Mexico:
Two white Suburban-type SUV’s rolled up and 15 to 
20 masked men stepped out bearing automatic rifles.
‘The security guards were ordered at gunpoint to 
open the magazine, and the gunmen made off with a 
large quantity of Tovex brand explosives and electric 
detonators,’ reads a report by the United States Bomb 
Data Center obtained by GlobalPost. . . .
. . . The report states that 267.75 pounds or 900 car-
tridges of the explosives as well as 230 electric detona-
tors were taken. . . .65 
That amount of explosive material is about 10 
times the yield of the low yield car bombs deployed by 
the cartels to date. Even more explosives, “412 chubs 
(plastic sleeves) of hydrogel commercial explosives” 
were seized from the cartels along with “36 electric 
detonators and more than 11 meters of detonation 
cord” in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, in April 2011.66 
It is thought by Burton and others that the cartels 
are not deploying larger yield car bombs because of 
the immense jumping of a “firebreak” such an escala-
tory deployment would represent. Crossing it would 
not only potentially trigger public outrage, but also 
possibly further escalate the state crackdown on the 
perpetrator cartel involved with using such a large 
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VBIED—it might even trigger increased U.S. govern-
mental support to Mexico over what would be con-
sidered a watershed event. Of note, however, is the 
possible recent use of hand grenade detonation of car 
fuel tanks for arson purposes. This would represent 
a more subtle form of anti-infrastructure attack that 
would limit the media effect if done after hours to an 
establishment containing few to no employees. 
Forecasting mid- and long-term cartel car bomb 
deployment patterns is more problematic. Although 
the devices employed to date are relatively crude and 
have yet to yield a high casualty count, over the last 
few years, they have increasingly been used as a tool 
of confrontation. As the conflict matures, it is plau-
sible that the use and quality (tactical lethality) of car 
bombs will increase as a similar escalation has been 
seen in other conflicts.67
Mexico’s criminal insurgencies appear to be esca-
lating not only with the use of car bombs, but other 
explosives including hand grenades (many appar-
ently stolen from Central American military arsenals) 
are also being employed. Clearly, grenades are not 
new in the Mexican narco-war, with thousands being 
seized from the gangs and cartels during the Calde-
rón presidency.68 In fact, in one well-known incident 
on September 15, 2008, sicarios tossed grenades into a 
crowd celebrating Mexico’s independence in Morelia, 
Michoacán, killing eight people and wounding more 
than 100. 
Grenades have also been used in assaults on police 
convoys and public officials, foreshadowing future 
car bomb potentials. Additionally, in the roughly 3 
1/2-year period preceding July 2010, the Mexican at-
torney general’s office made public the fact that 101 
grenade attacks against government buildings had 
taken place.69 
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Further concerns over increases in the tactical le-
thality of cartel weaponry can be witnessed by the 
appearance of more sophisticated systems such as 
claymore mines, mortar shells, and various forms of 
anti-tank munitions such as Russian RPGs and older 
U.S. LAWs.70 All of these weapons have the potential 
to be incorporated into future cartel VBIED systems 
to boost their effectiveness and/or be used in tandem 
with those systems in a combined arms manner. 
So, while a firebreak on cartel car bomb use for 
anti-infrastructure purposes presently exists, it cannot 
be considered sacrosanct. Wounded cartels, like wild 
animals, may be willing to resort to drastic measures 
(or at least threaten to undertake them) if they feel cor-
nered. This was evident with the Juárez cartel (aka the 
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization) following their 
July 2010 use of a car bomb ambush against respond-
ing police: 
La Linea threatened to employ a far larger IED (100 
kilograms, or 220 pounds) if the FBI and the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) did not investi-
gate the head of Chihuahua State Police intelligence, 
whom the VCF claimed was working for the Sinaloa 
Federation.71
The U.S. Government then went on to recognize 
the seriouness of cartel VBIED potentials in Mexico 
and deployed protective barriers at the U.S. Consul-
ate in Monterrey on April 5, 2011.72 With this in mind, 
steady state, slowly increasing, and quickly increasing 
car bomb use potentials in Mexico exists. The prog-
nosis for decreasing car bomb deployment currently 
appears unlikely—especially for analysts who have 
watched the death toll steadily rise in Mexico from the 
thousands to the low tens-of-thousands to likely now 
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over 80,000 individuals during the 6-year Calderón 
administration.73 
 These use trajectories include a continuation of 
the intermittent and targeted (discrete violence) with 
low yields currently evident. The next level up is de-
ployment patterns seen moving on to a mid-range po-
tential where cartels employ car bombs in occasional 
and targeted high yield attacks (targeting police mili-
tary and government facilities with more lethal vari-
ants of current platforms). A final and dire potential 
is frequent and indiscriminate use of car bombs (to 
kill lots of people); this represents the worst case—an 
unlikely potential scenario and representative of what 
took place back in Colombia decades ago. Thus far, 
car bombs have been used mainly in symbolic attacks 
against police—in fact, the total of all the dead and 
wounded from all cartel car bombs detonated to date 
in Mexico have not, as of yet, surpassed the casual-
ties from the singular 2008 Morelia grenade attack. At 
best, these contemporary attacks were likely intended 
to dissuade and disrupt enforcement actions by po-
lice and military forces (or in the case of the Televisa 
and Expreso attacks, to shape reportage of cartel ac-
tion). This use is largely symbolic violence with an 
instrumental purpose. Crude, small yield devices suf-
fice to make the statement. Should the cartels seek to 
engage in higher levels of direct confrontation with 
the state (including police and military forces), they 
may seek to use more sophisticated or higher yield de-
vices. Similar potentials have to at least be considered 
should the cartels opt to use car bombs as instruments 
of retaliation for arrests by the Mexican government 
or against other cartels—at that point, the potentials 
for Colombian level car bombing casualties in the 
hundreds may exist.
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The specter of car bombings in Mexico’s drug war 
also raises concerns across the border in the United 
States. These concerns include fear that the extreme 
violence of Mexico’s criminal insurgency could spill 
over into the United States. Beheadings, mass execu-
tions, the use of improvised armored vehicles (narco-
tanks), social cleansing, and internally displaced per-
sons suggest a macabre conflict has already emerged 
in Mexico.74 In fact, since about 2006, beheadings have 
gone from a relatively unheard of event to more than 
1,300 of them now being documented in the conflict 
between the gangs, cartels, and the Mexican state.75
Amplified by political concerns about illegal mi-
gration, some even see an alien horde ready to cross 
the Rio Grande, wreaking havoc throughout the Unit-
ed States, where Mexican cartels now operate in well 
over 1,000 cities.76 Since some cartels have threatened 
U.S. law enforcement officials—even at times placing 
bounties for their killing77—a concern is that cartels 
will ambush American police, potentially with car 
bombs used in an anti-personnel and/or anti-vehicu-
lar role. In one incident, a street gang member actually 
threw a fragmentation grenade into a Pharr, Texas, 
bar containing off duty officers in January 2009.78 Prec-
edent for such an ambush scenario can be drawn to 
a June 2008 Phoenix, AZ, incident in which a cartel 
kill-team was dressed in local special weapons attack 
team (SWAT) gear (an older uniform type) and, af-
ter a successful assassination of a local drug dealer, 
attempted to draw a responding police officer into 
an ambush.79 
Other scenarios include attacks on U.S. diplomatic 
personnel and consulates in Mexico, as well as attacks 
on border infrastructure or even U.S. Army posts and 
guard armories. However, the use of car bombs, at 
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least on U.S. soil and directed at U.S. governmental 
personnel operating in Mexico, is presently far from a 
likely potential.80 Organized crime groups (including 
the Mexican cartels) are more likely to seek to evade 
or corrupt and co-opt state actors than to confront the 
state, especially as one as strong as the United States.81 
Cartel behavior in Mexico, as we have seen, is an en-
tirely different matter, however, and becomes more 
and more emboldened with success as their impunity 
grows. This concern exists especially in towns, cities, 
and regions that fall under their de facto politicial con-
trol—many of which just happen to reside close to the 
U.S. border—because it may result in “hybrid” cartel 
behavior in some sovereign U.S. territory, which is 
less brazen than that found in Mexico but bolder than 
traditionally encountered in the United States.82
If cartel car bombs were to be eventually deployed 
on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in 
Mexico such as our consulates, we could expect that 
a pattern of I&W would be evident prior to such an 
attack or attacks.83 In that case, I&W would be drawn 
from precursor events such as grenade and IED at-
tacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and 
facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deploy-
ment patterns in Mexico, especially concerning in-
creases in tactical lethality and a shift toward anti- 
infrastructure targeting. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Essentially, the problem faced by both Mexican 
military and police agencies and U.S. police agencies 
is that combating potential high intensity/criminal 
insurgency attacks employing car bombs demands 
real-time intelligence support and superb tactical 
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and operational command, control, and communi-
cations, all of which require new doctrine, training, 
and equipment. Basically, we are seeing the need to 
develop “intra-conflict” policing capacity. Such a ca-
pacity requires embracing “full-spectrum policing” 
where police can quickly shift from individual com-
munity policing duties into a formed unit (contact or 
fire teams and squads for close quarters battle) for 
tactical engagements against an armed and organized 
opposing force. 
While nobody likes to admit it, the very real need 
for true “combat policing” capability beyond SWAT 
focused training that pertains to stacked tactics against 
one or two lightly armed and reactive barricade sus-
pects now exists. Initially, capability gap concerns 
were expressed pertaining to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda 
inspired operations taking place on U.S. soil, along 
with later Hezbollah linked terrorist potentials with 
some of these concerns drawn from the Beslan middle 
school massacre that took place in September 2004 and 
resulted in the death and injury of hundreds of chil-
dren.84 Recent examples of Mexcian cartel linked in-
cidents in the United States that have prompted such 
needs being discussed include the November 2011 
incidents in which a three-vehicle Zetas commando 
got into a firefight with law enforcement near Hous-
ton, TX, and several U.S. SWAT teams were deployed 
against over a dozen armed cartel and gang members 
who had crossed the border near Escobares, TX, after 
fleeing from a Mexican military offensive.85
These new capabilities are needed in Mexico, 
throughout Latin America, and here in the United 
States. To date, Mexico’s Federal police have been 
building a force structure that emphasizes the tactical 
gendarmerie-type skill set over the community police 
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capabilities needed to sustain urban security. Devel-
opment of the full range of police capacity, at all levels 
of the Mexican state (federal, state, and municipal), 
is essential. It goes without saying that such capacity 
must be corruption-free. This necessitates sustained 
police reform and significant capacity building.
The hybrid skills demanded by “full spectrum 
policing” would benefit from enhanced law enforce-
ment-military interaction for assessing emerging con-
flict, developing tactical and operational doctrine, and 
cross training. It is not simply a matter of bringing 
counterinsurgency (COIN) skills to the police service, 
but rather a reciprocal exchange of knowledge and 
experience to address “inter-conflict policing” where 
community policing and COIN converge to address 
the intersection of crime and war. At the strategic 
level, there is a need to define the role of police-mil-
itary interaction for convergent threats such as trans-
national organized crime, criminal insurgency, and 
crime in conflict zones. This may require new force 
structures (such as expeditionary police), as well as 
integrating existing capacities (such as formulating 
the traditional Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and 
Economic [DIME] as DIME-P, adding the police ser-
vice). Building an adaptive response capacity to ad-
dress urban terrorist tactics—including car bombs—
employed in the criminal insurgencies now occurring 
in Mexico and parts of Central America is essential.86 
This requires more than explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) or bomb squad responses. Explosives and am-
bush awareness must be integrated into all police and 
emergency (fire/EMS; emergency medical services) 
response at the general service (patrol, first response) 
levels in the United States and Latin America. The les-
sons learned in countering car bombs and IEDs in Iraq 
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and Afghanistan, and now Mexico, must be shared 
and integrated into evolving public safety doctrine 
and emerging police operational art.
Derived from the future cartel car bombing poten-
tials identified for Mexico, and also those potentials 
as they pertain to U.S. personnel and facilities on 
both sides of the border, and the preceding conclu-
sions reached concerning the need for “full-spectrum 
policing” with the inclusion of a developed “combat-
policing” capability, some initial response recommen-
dations will be suggested. These response recommen-
dations will be focused upon how the U.S. Army and 
the broader U.S. defense community—which have 
had recent extensive experience with IEDs, car bombs, 
and terrorist and insurgent tactics in the Iraqi and 
AfPak areas of operation—can better support both: 
a) the military and the federal, state, and local police 
agencies of the Mexican state; and, b) the various U.S. 
federal, state, and local police agencies operating near 
the U.S.-Mexican border:
These recommendations will be clustered into four 
thematic areas and will be generalized for both inter-
nal Mexican and U.S. border region requirements. The 
extent to which these forms of support may be pro-
vided should be considered situational and based on a 
determinaiton of need derived from the severity of the 
car bombing, and overall Mexican cartel, threat pro-
jected. These initial recommendations for U.S. Army 
and defense community support are as follows: 
•  Intelligence. The basic historical overview of Co-
lombian and Mexican cartel VBIED (and IEDs 
in cars) incidents and the indications and warn-
ings (I&W) discussion prior to the resumption 
of a new wave of car bombings in Mexico can 
be greatly expanded upon via the use of infor-
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mation beyond that provided by open source 
intelligence (OSINT). Such information, and 
the military intelligence process behind it that 
focuses on futures and enemy intent—rather 
than backwards looking criminal intelligence 
that attempts to link a perpetrator in time and 
space back to a specific crime—is vital for both 
Mexican and U.S law enforcement to better un-
derstand and plan for a tactical and operational 
environment in which car bombs, IEDs, and 
infantry weapons utilized by cartel and gang 
members exist. The National Ground Intelli-
gence Center (NGIC), a component of United 
States Army Intelligence and Security Com-
mand (USAISC), would be a natural candidate 
for this tasking, as potentially would be the U.S. 
Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) 
with its non-state threat analysis—though the 
intelligence training and products produced 
would be required to be at the unclassified, yet 
limited distribution/sensitive and non-restric-
tion on use OSINT levels for law enforcement 
utilization. 
•  Organization. Past law enforcement organiza-
tional emphasis has focused on tactical level 
applications—typically with either one or two 
officers assigned to a patrol car. SWAT teams 
in smaller cities and towns are considered a 
collateral duty, as opposed to dedicated teams 
in major cities, and at best will typically be 
composed of a 4-5 man fire team or roughly 
a 11-man squad equivalent unit with more 
advanced teams fielding a combat medic. In 
rural policing situations, a lone deputy can be 
expected to cover a wide geographic area and 
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will be the first on scene to active shooter (agres-
sor) incidents with no backup for long periods 
of time. For U.S. law enforcement to begin to 
gain an upper tier ‘combat-policing’ capability 
in the face of Mexican cartel threats, new orga-
nizational policing forms need to be explored. 
For border law enforcement found in the larger 
cities, this would likely include platoon size (3 
squads) manuever elements. Further, SWAT, 
bomb squad, and air resources integrated to-
gether will be required to mitigate some poten-
tial threat scenarios involving cartel kill-teams 
integrated with IEDs and/or car bomb deploy-
ment. Swarming principals—derived from the 
work of John Arquilla—which are influencing 
U.S. Department of Defense organizational 
thinking also provide immediate utility for U.S 
and Mexican law enforcement, especially in 
more rural areas where law enforcement offi-
cers will respond to an incident in a hasty and 
adhoc manner.87 Hence, the U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) would be 
of immense benefit in providing organizational 
support thinking to law enforcement on both 
sides of the border.
•  Training. Law enforcement is used to function-
ing in an operational environment character-
ized by that of crime—not one characterized by 
conflict and war. As a result, law enforcement 
officers on both sides of the border do not nor-
mally understand military concepts, much less 
perceptions of an opposition force (OPFOR) 
that engages in proactive offensive operations, 
drawing upon both physical and psychological 
forms of violence, designed to eliminate armed 
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organized resistance. Further, both authors 
have trained rooms full of law enforcement of-
ficers who, save for some reserve and former 
military personnel, were unable to identify basic 
military weaponry such as 40mm grenades for 
the U.S. M203 grenade launcher or understand 
common military acrynoms such as OODA 
loops or OPSEC. Service and joint programs, 
such as U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand and the Joint IED Defeat Organization 
(JIEDDO), can provide both basic training in 
such areas as IED/Car Bomb/Infantry Weapons 
Awareness, Basic Infantry Tactics/Force Protection, 
and Counterintelligence/OPSEC for general law 
enforcement units and more specific training 
on topics such as Insurgent IED/Car Bomb TTPs/
Countermeasures for bomb squad personnel.
U.S. SWAT teams, in some jurisdictions, are also 
now benefiting from MACTAC (Multi-Assault Coun-
ter-Terrorism Action Capabilities) training that is mil-
itary inspired. This training, when combined with a 
grounding in the use of the U.S. Army Standard 9-line 
UXO Report and counter-IED awarneness, would sig-
nificantly help promote increased SWAT capability 
against VBIED and ambush derived IED threats. 
•  Equipment. Over a decade of U.S. Army cam-
paigning in Iraq and Afghanistan has provided 
the organization with an intimate knowledge of 
IEDs, car bombs, and other insurgent ambush 
techniques. Specific equipment requirements 
and a vetting of COTS (commercial off-the-
shelf) products from lessons learned and paid 
in the blood of our service personnel has result-
ed in a wealth of expertise that can be directly 
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provided to Mexican and U.S. law enforcement 
agencies to support their procurement needs. 
The best route for coordinated U.S. law enforce-
ment support would be via the InterAgency 
Board (IAB) for Equipment Standardization and 
Interoperability, which has a special emphasis 
on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
or Explosive (CBRNE) issues. The Joint IED De-
feat Organization (JIEDDO) should also have a 
direct role in supporting this process. Support 
to Mexican governmental authorities should 
be directed through SEDENA (Secretaría de la 
Defensa Nacional) for the Army and Air Force 
and through SEMAR (Secretaría de Marina) for 
the Navy. Both armed forces are actively en-
gaging the cartels, with the Army being used 
for stability and support operations and the 
Navy primary engaging in more specialized 
operations against the cartel leadership. U.S. 
military equipment support to Mexican law 
enforcement, however, will be more problem-
atic, with currently two federal agencies, 31 
state agencies, and well over 1,500 municipal 
agencies existing. 
Reappraisal of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—
enacted in a far different domestic security environ-
ment bereft of armed and organized nonstate threat 
entities able to challenge states—is also required if 
we are to lift some legal restrictions on U.S. military 
support to U.S. law enforcement agencies.88 These 
recommendations, will, of course, also be required 
to be integrated and subordinated to ongoing U.S. 
initiatives and programs—such as Mérida Initiative 
and follow-on congressional authorizations—and 
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ongoing U.S. domestic law enforcement support 
operations initiated by the DEA, elements of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other U.S. 
governmental agencies.89
Addressing the challenges posed by cartel sicarios 
is a hemispheric security challenge. In addition to in-
ternal U.S. military efforts and U.S. support to Mexi-
can military (both SEDENA and SEMAR) and law en-
forcement (at all levels: federal, state, and municipal), 
support should also be extended to Central American 
states facing cartel and gang challenges. An impor-
tant initiative in this regard is the dramatic increase 
in senior leader engagements and Subject Matter Ex-
pert Exchanges (SMEE)/Mobile Training Team (MTT) 
activities between the Mexico branch of US Army 
North’s (ARNORTH) Security Cooperation Division 
and SEDENA. These engagements and activities have 
gone from three in FY 2009 to 98 in FY 2012.90
Additionally, Mexican security agencies (the affor-
ementioned military and police, as well as CISEN-Cen-
tro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, the PGR-Pro-
curaduría General de la República, and state prosecutors) 
need the knowledge and skills to recognize, avoid, or 
contain; safely respond to; and render safe car bombs 
and other IEDs. They also need the forensic science 
skills to investigate car bomb crime scenes and pre-
pare cases for prosecution. It is not enough to transfer 
skills to the military. Local responders are potential 
targets of attack and likely the first to respond to a 
bomb scene. Police and other local level responders 
(emergency medical services), the Cruz Rojo Mexicana 
(Mexican Red Cross), and bomberos firefighters need 
the skills to safely respond to, contain, and investigate 
car bomb attacks. This requires comprehensive civil-
military security sector support.
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Ultimately, a comprehensive U.S. Northern Com-
mand (USNORTHCOM) strategy should be devel-
oped in coordination with the Mexican government 
that integrates all elements of national power to miti-
gate and counter Mexican cartel use of car bombs and 
other forms of violence and corruption manifesting 
themselves in Mexico and increasingly in the United 
States. To best serve our national interests, however, 
this comprehensive strategy should also be integrated 
with the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 
to create a Western Hemispheric strategy to combat 
gang, cartel, and other criminal insurgent threats to 
the Americas.91
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